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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States decided Federal Trade Commission v.
Actavis, Inc.' in the summer of 2013. The case opened up pharmaceutical
developers with reverse payment settlements (pay-for-delay agreements) to
potential antitrust liability. This decision resolved a circuit split and had many
declaring the judgment a legal victory. 2 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
reported that just one year after the ruling, "pharmaceutical companies entered
into substantially fewer potential pay-for-delay patent dispute settlements,"
effectively ending a consistent increase in these types of settlements.3 Pay-for-
delay agreements almost exclusively involve drug manufacturing,4 and it is
generally thought that pay-for-delay agreements in this context harm American
consumers.5
Pay-for-delay agreements outside of pharmaceutical manufacturing
arrangements have merits that potentially outweigh the costs. There are
markets where pay-for-delay agreements can fulfill their specific goals while also
benefiting the consumer, specifically, generic medical-devices manufactured by
emergency care hospitals. Generic medical devices are now possible with the
rise of 3-D printing technology, and American hospitals are uniquely equipped
to enter into the market. As the technology infiltrates this particular market,
regulators will have to decide if reverse payment settlements will fall under the
Actavis umbrella.
It is important that these regulators consider the function of reverse
payment settlements and the law that governs them. Reverse payment
settlements teeter between two areas of federal law: (1) patent protection
through the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and (2) the Sherman Antitrust
Act policed by the FTC. Both areas of law have conflicting goals and must be
1 133 S. Ct. 2223 (U.S. 2013).
2 Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal
Annual Dinner: FTC v. Actavis and the Future of Reverse Payment Cases 2-3 (Sept. 26, 2013).
3 Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC Report on Drug Patent Settlements Shows
Potential Pay-for-Delay Deals Decreased Substantially in the First Year Since Supreme Court's
Actavis Decision (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file with author), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2016/01 / ftc-report-drug-patent-settlements-shows-potential-pay-delay.
4 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
s John F. Duffy et al., 2013 National Layers Convention: Intellectual Propery: Intellectual Propert,
Free Markets, and Competition Poiy, 37 HAMLINE L. REv. 523, 537 (2014); see also Actavis, 133 S. Ct.
at 2235.
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understood separately before exploring their overlap. 6 It is also important to
review the current climate of both the medical device and hospital provider
industries in the United States. It is the intersection of these four distinctive
areas, patent law, antitrust law, the medical device industry, and medical
providers, that creates an interesting problem. If it is possible that reverse
payment schemes are beneficial to both the consumers and the providers while
also falling within the tolerable boundaries of both patent and antitrust law,
should the Supreme Court revisit reverse payment patent settlements for
medical devices for hospitals? Is it possible that these settlements can be
consumer friendly outside of the pharmaceutical industry, thereby allowing
name brand medical device developers with reverse payment settlements to be
shielded from antitrust litigation?
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF PATENT PROTECTION
Under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress has
the authority to create legislation to promote production and protect the work
product of inventors by granting individuals temporary exclusive rights over
their inventions.7 The right to a product monopoly8 serves as a potential
financial incentive for inventors not only to create, but also to share how the
invention functions. The exclusive right is a tradeoff for the knowledge-the
patent will eventually expire and be a part of the public collective knowledge.9
Patent rights are codified under Title 35 of the United States Code 0 and
6 Michele M. Kang, ANDA Reverse Payments and the Post-Actavis Landscape, 8 I-txs~riNcs Sct. &
TECH. L.J. 73, 80 (2016) (examining the patent law's conflicts with antitrust goals and antitrust
rulings on patent settlements).
7 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
8 See Kang, supra note 6; contra Duffy et al., supra note 5, at 524 (Professor J. F. Duffy expresses
concerns for viewing the U.S. patent system as a monopoly granting authority). With no codified
legal definition provided in the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012), the colloquial
definition of monopoly will be relied upon here: "exclusive ownership through legal privilege,
command of supply, or concerted action." Monopo4, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th cd. 2003). It
should be noted, however, in line with Professor J.F. Duffy's argument, that under the formal
legal test used by the FTC to determine illegal monopolies, patent rights might not be considered
squarely monopolies. Antitrust Laws and You, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
atr/antitrust-laws-and-you (last updated Jan. 5, 2017).
9 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
1o 35 U.S.C. § 1-390 (2012), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_1
aws.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
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administered by the PTO." Valid patents grant the holder exclusive rights to
produce the good protected within its claims.12
Patent holders were historically not given free rein in the market of their
legal monopolies. In the past, patent-misuse occurred when a patent holder
behaved in a manner that was considered outside the scope of the patent grant
or had substantial market effects, like monopolization. 3 Critique of patent
holders' market activity has a significant case history that has helped build
current patent-misuse law. Like antitrust litigation, the revisions in statutory
interpretations by the Court create a clearer vision of current law. Initially, a
patent's exclusive rights granted the holder wide berth from market-behavior
regulation. This broad protection was introduced in the 1912 Supreme Court
case, Heny v. A.B. Dick Co.14 Decided during possibly the most restrictive time
in patent infringement litigation, this decision resulted in exaggerated respect
for patent holders' rights. Hent v. A.B. Dick Co. barred an affirmative defense
that a patent holder's market activity overstepped the rights of the patent
monopoly." The Court actively reexamined the holding, and the doctrine was
subsequently jettisoned only two years later in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co.16 by the Supreme Court. Notably, however, formal
patent misuse laws remained in neither judge-made law nor legislation until the
1942 case, Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Supiger Co.17
Patent-infringement cases continued to be met with misuse affirmative
defenses despite legislative action recognizing misuse as an exception to the
patent monopoly. The courts took steps to limit patent holders' behavior by
formally introducing "patent-misuse" in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.' At
the same time, the legislature took steps to limit these defenses with the 1952
Patent Act, which included defining infringement for the first time.'9  These
11 General Information Concerning Patents: Patent Laws, USPTO (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.
gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-3.
12 35 U.S.C. § 201(d)-(g) (2012).
13 Thomas F. Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent Rights and the Pubic Interest, 11
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 46,46 (1969).
14 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912).
15 Id; see also Joe Potenza, Phillip Bennett & Christopher Roth, Patent Misuse - The Critical
Balance, A Patent Langer's View, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 75 (2006).
16 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
17 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
18 Daniel P. Horniller, Patent Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National Harrow to 'The Nine No-
Nos" to Not Like#, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. Riv. 7, 1 11, http://scholarship.1aw.duke.edu/cgi/viewc
ontent.cgi?artile=1153&context=dltr (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Supp ier Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942)).
19 Jingyuan Luo, Concluding the Akamai Chapter of Divided Infringement: Is the Liabiiy Loophole
Closed?, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 467, 470 (2016).
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steps did not quell the patent-misuse allegations, and the frenzy to regulate
patent holders' market behavior reached an all-time high with the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Bruce B. Wilson's
infamous "Nine No-Nos." 20 The list, which was proposed and supported by
the Justice Department, enumerated the per se misuse practices. At the height
of widespread patent regulation, patent holders risked their licensing rights by
participating in "behavior that arguably constitutes an attempt to 'extend' the
patent monopoly." 2' Courts continued to interpret qualifications for patent
misuse, which created circuit splits until Congress passed the Patent Misuse
Reform Act of 1988.22 Within the Act, Congress codified a set of "safe
harbors" within 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) to clarify what qualifies as an overextension
of patent protection that would be open to a misuse affirmative defense.
B. CURRENT STATE OF PATENT PROTECTION
Prior to the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), the
U.S. had a first-to-invent system-awarding patents to the inventor who
established proof of the concept first. AIA, which only affects patents filed
after March 16, 2013, brought a significant change to the United States patent
system. The United States is now a first-to-file system, 23 but the Act also
opened up issued patents to a new and more extensive reexamnation process.
Now, the only way to legally enter the market of a patented good is to bring a
successful federal suit or reexamination request challenging the validity of the
patent.24 Challenges are primarily brought by competitors in district courts, but
competitors can also enter a request for reexamination 25 by the PTO under 35
U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) or (3).26 While the court can hear any invalidity case, there
20 Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks before the Fourth New
England Antitrust Conference, Patent and Know-How 1icense Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price
and Quantity Restrictions (Nov. 6, 1970).
21 Homiller, supra note 18, T 14.
2 Id¶ 18.
23 Nathan Hurst, How the America Invents Act Will Change Patenting Forever, WIRED (Mar. 19,
2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/america-invents-act/.
24 Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine ofFair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177,
1180 (2000).
25 See also Douglas J. Duff, Comment, The Reexamination Power of Patent Infringers and the Forgotten
Inventor, 41 CAP. U. L. REv. 693, 697 (2013) (noting that there are three types of reexaminations:
ex parte reexaminations, inter partes reviews, and post-grant reviews).
26 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 47 (2011); see Comparison of Selected Sections of PRE-AZA and AIA
U.S. Patent Law, INTELL. PROP. OWNERs Ass'N (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.ipo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/PatentReform ChartComparison.ofAIA_andPre-AIALawsFI
N.ALpdf (providing additional information regarding the recent changes to inter partes reviews
3592017]
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are limits to these administrative reexammations because "the only issues the
Board is allowed to consider in inter partes review (IPR) proceedings are
novelty and obviousness." 27  It is important to note that the American
Intellectual Property Law Association estimates that the "all-in" cost for an IPR
is around $300,000.28 This review is still staggeringly less expensive than the
average cost to litigate a patent invalidity claim in district court, which can rise
well into the millions.29 These costs are correlated to, if not caused by, a record
high in documented settlements in the pharmaceutical industry in 2014.30 While
these entry barriers are all protected under Title 35 of the United States Code,
the difficulty and overhead cost of challenging existing patents hindering market
entry is a flag indicating a potential Sherman Antitrust Act dispute.
Once an individual has a valid patent, there are restrictions to its use in the
market.3' After the enactment of the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988,32 the
popularity of misuse as a defense has been on a steady decline.33 This trend is
important; it demonstrates the growing strength of patent protection and the
widening range of rights patent holders are gaining to control the market space
granted to them by the PTO. While patent holders are not immune from
certain public policy concerns when engaging in practices that could be
considered misuse, there is substantial expansion of tolerable behavior since the
placing a limit the time frame of reexamination request under the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)); see also Duffy et al., supra note 5, at 694 (noting an
upward trend in reexamination filings).
z7 Gregory Dolin, The Costs of Patent 'Reform" The Abuse of the PTO's Administrative Review
Programs, Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Dec. 2014).
2 Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REv. 881, 933 n.369 (2015) (citing ToM
ENGELLENNER, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ASS'N, COMPARISON OF FEDERAL COURT, ITC, AND
USPTO PROCEEDINGS IN IP DISPUTES 21, 22 (Jan. 2014)) (noting that other sources cite a rage of
$300,000-$500,000); see also Post Issuance Fees, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://
www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule#PatentPost/esu
anceFees (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
29 Duffy et al., supra note 5, at 701.
3 Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-trade-co
mmission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafyl4rpt.pdf (January 2016
was the first time that the Bureau of Competition published claim settlement data for an entire
fiscal year post-Actavis).
3' Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed be the Tie?," 4 I-ARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 1 (1991).
32 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
33 Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 Mici-T. TELECOMM. TECi. L.
REv. 299, 328 (2014).
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"Nine No-Nos." 34 Behavior is monitored, but there are no longer per se
offenses. The safe harbors within 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) help guide patent holders,
but courts retain considerable control to balance private and public interests in
misuse cases.35
C. HISTOIUCAL CONTEXT OF ANTITRUST LAW
To decipher when patent protection might not shield an inventor from
monopolistic practices, it is important to unravel the statutory provisions and
case law that has led to the current understanding of the Sherman Antitrust
Act3 6 and its companion, the Clayton Act.3 7 While many articles and case
holdings on reverse payment plans have given a proportionally brief
background understanding on the statute,3 8 it might help to delve a bit more
into the contours of the law to create a complete picture before integrating it
with patent protection law.
Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
The statute derives from the Commerce Clause which grants Congress the
authority to regulate interstate commerce.39 The Act's primary purpose is to
delegate "the Federal Government to institute proceedings against trusts in
order to dissolve them"40 for the explicit benefit of the consumer.4 ' There is
not a single instance of the words 'promote,' 'protect,' 'fair,' 'market,' or
'competition' in the Sherman Antitrust Act.42 Most colloquial, not to mention
scholarly, understandings of antitrust goals are articulated consistently as
"promoting fair market competition."4 3 The original drafted language of the
Act directly asserted the promotion of competition goal, but the language was
34 Kenneth M. Frankel & Mark S. Zhai, A Return to the DOJ's 'Nine No-No"?, FINNEGAN (Jan.
2013), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9324c489-94fe-4b
bO-a499-8a8817794e44.
3s Lim, supra note 33, at 308-09.
36 15 U.S.C. %§ 1-7 (2012).
37 15 U.S.C. %6 12-27 (2012).
38 See general# Kang, supra note 6; Taylor Burke & Sara Rosenbaum, Alining Health Care Market
Incentives in an Information Age: The Role ofAntitrust Law, 5 J. HEAm T & BIOMED. L. 151, 164 (2009).
39 Sherman Anti-Tmst Act (1890), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, 2016, http://www.ourdocuments.
gov/doc.php?doc=51 (referencing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3).
40 Id
41 Guide to Antitmst Laws: The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2016, https://www.ftc.
gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws.
42 15 U.S.C. %9 1-7 (2012).
43 See Burke & Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at 163; Lim, supra note 33, at 299, 310 (direct quote
supporting assertion that "the antitrust laws promote vigorous competition" as an accepted
overview of antitrust law).
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intentionally removed from the final passed text." This omission caused
disagreement within the courts: should the elimination of trust be motivated for
the good of competition or the good of the consumer?45 The Court never
clarified the goal of the legislation and artfully danced around the conflict
between competition-driven versus consumer-interest-driven legislative intent.46
Yet, the beginning of the 1900s saw this un-codified interest in protecting
competition to be a prevailing sentiment that was punctuated in the majority
opinion of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.47 It was not until 1914
when Congress enacted the Clayton Act"' that the U.S. antitrust legislation
officially included 'competition' in the legal vocabulary. 9
The Clayton Act formally codified the role of competition in antitrust laws.
While the Act has seen several amendments,50 it introduced the "may tend"
standard when assessing anticompetitive effects. This change is considered a
softening and not "nearly so rigorous an analysis in determining the outlook for
anticompetitive effects" as previously codified.5' The direct results of this
change are seen in the current state of antitrust law.
D. CURRENT STATE OF ANTITRUST LAW
United States antitrust law is now controlled by a combination of legislation,
common law, and regulatory agencies. 52 The motives behind antitrust law has
moved from strictly consumer centric to understanding the totality of the
market economy.53 When assessing the legality of a monopoly, courts now
44 Barak Orbach, The Goals ofAntitrust: How Antitrust Lost Its Goal 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253,
2261 (2013).
45 See Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 410 (1904) (1-lolmes, J., dissenting)
("The law, I repeat, says nothing about competition . . . .").
46 See Orbach, supra note 44, at 2268 (noting that the Supreme Court never commented on the
implications of the Sherman Antitrust Act nor mentioned its ramifications on competition in the
market place).
- 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
- 15 U.S.C. §5 12-27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2012).
49 15 U.S.C. %§ 12-27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. % 52-53 (2012) (where 'competition' is used fifteen
times total in the 21,569 word legislation).
5 "The Antitrust Laws," Guide to Antitrust Lows, FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2016, https://www.
ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Apr.
23, 2017).
51 James R. Loftis, Coordinated Effects, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Feb.
18, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/coordinated-effects.
52 Justin (Gus) lurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1192 (2014).
s3 Id at 1198.
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apply a rule of reason instead of a per se analysis.54 The rule of reason does not
prohibit any particular action, but instead employs a balancing test asking three
questions: "(1) What harm to competition results or may result from the
collaborators' activities?" (2) Are the motivations behind the actions legitimate?
(3) Are there less intrusive options?55 The court uses these questions to decide
if the activity in question violates antitrust laws. The rule of reason lends itself
to inconsistent holdings, and the case holdings often reflect the economic
climate of the case in question.5 6 Therefore, the legality of cooperate activity is
often best predicted by recent precedent.57 Antitrust scrutiny was on the rise in
2008 culminating with the inauguration of President Obama who expressly
campaigned for increased "review of merger activity."58 Antitrust agencies saw
significant wins in 2015 with threats of antitrust litigation terminating major
merger deals. The most notable of these are the Department of justice (DO])
threatening and effectively stopping the Comcast/Time Warner Cable merger,59
and the DOJ filing a complaint and terminating the General Electric/Electrolux
merger. 60  Yet, 2016 had a slightly different narrative, with the Federal
Communications Commission and the DOJ approving the merger of Time
Warner Cable and Charter61 consummated in May 2016.62 The DOJ and the
FTC are not the only actors terminating major mergers. The largest
pharmaceutical merger between Pfizer and Allergan ended in 2016 by an
54 Lim, supra note 33, at 370; see Phillip Areeda, The 'Rale of Reason" in Antitrust Analsis: General
Issues, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1 (June 1981), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/defult/files/materia
Is/2017/antitrust.pdf (noting that the distinction, while present, is a relatively simple concept).
ss Areeda, supra note 54, at 2.
56 See Lim, supra note 33, at 370.
57 Areeda, supra note 54, at 26.
58 Jacqueline Grise et al., Top 10 Antitrust Developments And Trends To Watch This Year, LAw360
(Jan. 12, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/745809/top-10-antitrust-developmc
nts-and-trends-to-watch-this-year.
59 Roger Yu & Mike Snider, How Comcast, Time Warner Cable Deal Unraveled, USA TODAY (Apr.
25, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/04/24/how-comcast-deal-to-buy-time-
warner-cable-fell-apart/26313471 /.
60 Simon Johnson & Diane Bartz, GE Calls Off Electrolux Appliance Deal Amid U.S. Antitrust
Fight REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ge-equity-electrolux-
idUSKBNOTQOMP20151207.
61 Chris Morran, 5 Things You Should Know About The Approved Merger of Time Warner Cable &
Charter, CONSUMERISJr (Apr. 25, 2016, 4:55 PM), https://consumerist.com/2016/04/25/4-things-
you-should-know-about-the-approved-merger-of-time-warner-cable-charter.
62 Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable and Bright House Networkr Complete Transactions, TIME
WARNER CABLE (May 18, 2016), http://ir.timewarnercable.com/investor-relations/investor-new
s/financial-release-details/2016/Charter-Communications-Time-Warner-Cable-and-Bright-Hous
e-Networks-Complete-Transactions/default.aspx.
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extremely unfavorable taxation regulation passed by the U.S. Treasury before
the FTC could officially stop the merger itself.63
All monopolies are not illegal, however. Legislators have taken special efforts
to ensure that some markets remain under the control of a single corporation or
refined group. Legal monopolies exist in multiple forms such as public service-
providers, like water and waste management, or intellectual-property protection,
like copyright to a novel. This selective tolerance of monopolies is motivated by
an understanding that the benefits incurred by allowing market control outweigh
the concerns."' Sometimes called natural monopolies, these types of single
market controlled entities are characterized as "industries where capital costs are
especially high and unusually high barriers to entry for other firms exist. Thus,
large economies of scale make it socially optimal to only have one supplier in the
industry."6 5 These monopolies have limits; public service providers are restrained
by price requirementS 66 while intellectual property rights are restrained by time
(patents),67 specificity of use (copyright),6" or a continuation of market strength
(trademark).69 However, these natural monopolies are not without considerable
legal questions. Many politicians advocate for the lessening of state regulated
community resources in attempt to open up suppliers to free market price
demands.70 This fear of price collusion and the role state-granted monopolies
play in unnatural market costs are most hotly contested in the energy providers
sector.7 1 So while these types of government agreements do exist for service
providers, they are not without staunch opposers. Whether or not the same
opposition exists for intellectual property rights seems to be strongly based on the
industry where the monopoly exists.
63 David McLaughlin, PfiZer-Allergan Deal Faces In-Depth Antitrust Probe by U.S., BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 30, 2016, 1:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-30/pfizer-allerga
n-deal-faces-in-depth-antitrust-probe-by-u-s.
SRichard A. Epstein, Justfied Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and Telecommunications, 56
CASE W. REs. 103, 106 (2005).
65 Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A HistoU of Crony
Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 983, 1091 (2013).
66 Id at 1093.
67 Chapter 2: Fields of Intellectual Property Protection, WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK:
POLIcY, LAW AND USE, ¶ 2.5 (2004), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/ipr
m/pdf/ch2.pdf.
- Id 2.164.
69 Id 2.796.
70 FIoNA M. Scorr MORTON, The Problems of Price Controls, CATO REv. oF Bus. & Gov'T, 24
REGULATION, No. 1 (2001), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/problems-price-
controls.
7' Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine and Competition In
Electricty, 46 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 921, 925 (2013).
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III. PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW
Patent misuse and antitrust policies are not inherently the same. While there
is some overlap, it would undercut both policies to assume both had the same
coverage and exceptions. 72  Many legal sources state in some manner that
under the Sherman Act, the antitrust analysis for patent antitrust claims is
complex because the purpose of patent law-to grant a legal monopoly-
contradicts the purpose of antitrust law-to prevent a monopoly. But with
both areas of law being particularly malleable by the courts, they could fit
together without aversion. Patent misuse, as discussed above, is an
overreaching policy concern when the patent holder acts in a way that
regulatory boards and courts see as noxious to the market. The patent misuse
claim, therefore, lacks steady outcomes in U.S. litigation.73  Currently
downtrending in litigation, patent misuse claims are governed by the U.S.C.'s
enumerated Safe Harbors that leave courts with much deference.74  Antitrust
law also follows this amorphous state, but with a richer legislative history to
form rational conjectures. The government is actively concerned with the
anticompetitive effects of business activity,75 the interest of the consumer is no
longer the singular concern in the analysis of these cases7 6 which are, instead,
governed by the rule of reason,77 and certain state-granted monopolies are
permissible if advantageous to public policy.78 Therefore, it is possible from the
legislative and case study background of both patent and antitrust law that the
popular assumption that the motivation driving these two areas of law
contradict79 is not accurate.
Patent protection and anti-trust law come together then in the area of
tolerated monopolies. This is where the two do not conflict. The case law
surrounding the intersection of the two however is exceedingly narrow. Most
commonly, problems arise around the time of patent expiration. The Supreme
Court established unlawful extension of patent protection in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
a case involving a licensing contract that extended past the statutory patent
protection period.80 The court in this case was clear: any attempt to extend the
72 Robin C. Feldman, The Insuffidenc ofAntitrustAnaysis for Patent Misuse, 55 H-ASTINGS L.J. 399,
400 (2003).
73 Burchfiel, supra note 31.
74 Lim, supra note 33.
7s See spra text accompanying note 50.
76 See supra text accompanying note 53.
77 See supra text accompanying note 56.
78 See supra text accompanying note 65.
79 Robin Feldman, Patent andAntitmst: Differing Shades ofMeaning, 13 VA.J.L. & TECH. 1,2 (2008).
80 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964).
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protections lawfully provided by the patent was not permissible per se.81 This
case was not decided under an antitrust theory, but a patent misuse affirmative
defense.82 The backlash of this decision was swift. Scholars argue that the
decision lacked economic sophistication,83 the limited marketplace effects, and
overreaching by the courts that could actually adversely affect competition.84
Even with extended licensing agreements, the expiration of patent protection
will allow other third-party manufacturers to enter the market that are not tied
up in licensing agreements.85 These marketplace concerns are not rooted in
patent law however; these are clearly antitrust concerns seeping into patent
litigation. The convergence is elegant here. The court interweaves patents,
monopolies, bargaining power, and free-market terminology without the
tension scholars have assumed was inherently present.86 Perhaps more telling is
despite the backlash, the Court has upheld this ruling within the last year.
The Supreme Court refused to succumb to decades of scrutiny and upheld
the Brlotte decision in the 2015 case, Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC87 The
court held that if patent holders want extended protection past the protection
period, they "must seek relief not from this Court but from Congress."8 8 The
case silences the concerns of Brulotte; despite the possibly incorrect economic
theory assumed, "there was no empirical evidence showing that Brmlotte has
decreased innovation."8 9 While the court does recognize that Brulotte concerns
both patent and contract law,90 it still fails to recognize the importance of the
third, and possibly more controlling, area of law present in the cases: antitrust.
The court in fact goes as far as denouncing its application-
Recall that he wants courts to employ antitrust law's rule of
reason to identify and invalidate those post-expiration royalty
clauses with anticompetitive consequences. But whatever its
81 Id at 32.
82 Id at 30.
83 Scott W. Doyle et al., Brulotte Rule Upbeld Despite Suspect Economic Rationale, LAW360 (June 23,
2015, 6:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/670682/brulotte-rule-uphled-despite-suspect-
economic-rationale.
84 Susan Mazurek, Patent Licensing Tangled in the Brulotte Web: A Comprehensive Anaysis of the
Supreme Court's Opportunity To Reconsider a Fifry-Year-Old Precedent in Light of Widespread Criticism, 18
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 237, 246 (2015).
85 Doyle et al., supra note 83.
86 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
87 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, No. 13-720 (U.S. June 22, 2015).
88 Id at 1.
89 Cassandra E. Havens, Saving Patent Law from Competition Poluy and Economic Theories: Kimble v.
Marvel Entertainment, 31 BERKELEY TEC-I. L.J. 371, 382 (2016).
0 Iimble, slip op. at 9.
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merits may be for deciding antitrust claims, that "elaborate
inquiry" produces notoriously high litigation costs and
unpredictable results. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc.,
457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). For that reason, trading in Brulotte for
the rule of reason would make the law less, not more, workable
than it is now.91
In attempt to keep the two areas of law separate, the court effectively creates a
new per se rule: if a patent expires and the patent holder attempts to extend his
rights, the patent holder is subjected to not only patent misuse affirmative
defense, but also antitrust litigation.
A. PAY-FOR-DELAY AGREEMENTS
Reverse payment settlements primarily occur in the pharmaceutical
industry92 and serve as a mechanism for delaying generic drugs from entering
the market of a patented drug.93 They are a natural extension of Brulotte and
Kimble. Pay-for-delay agreements not only extend the patent-protection period
by incentivizing certain generic manufacturers to not enter the market, they also
can impose a duty of no contest to the validity of the original patent.94 These
agreements are unicorns in industry; they are one of the few corporate contracts
that result in increased net profit for both the generic and patent holding
manufacturers. The FTC has declared fighting these agreements is a "top
priority" and predicts that they are responsible for a $3.5 billion excess for
consumers.9 5 While the FTC may have painted pay-for-delay agreements as an
exaggerated villain, it is important to understand how the economics and recent
policy changes converge to make these plans profitable.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, eased the pathway to FDA
approval for generic drug manufacturers. 96 The act created the Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) for generics seeking FDA approval for
substantially similar to a FDA approved brand-named counterpart. Similarity is
determined by the same "dosage form, strength, route of administration,
91 Id at 12 (citation omitted).
92 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
93 Kang, supra note 6, at 78.
94 Id
9s Pay for Delay, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/
mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
96 Kang, supra note 6, at 76.
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quality, performance characteristics and intended use."9 7 This approval process
is a race similar to development-the first to file for a generic is granted specific
rights without the any agreement with the original patent holder. With just
forty-five days to bring suit against the generic, the original inventor is left out
of the rights process for the generic.98 This is intentional. The goals of the Act
are to reduce consumer cost and increase competition in the marketplace.99
The Act grants many rights to the first to file generic-most notable is a 180-
day monopoly over generic sales once the patent has expired. 00 It is this
provision of the Act that motivates most pay-for-delay agreements and sparked
the current trend to form these agreements.' 0
These types of settlement agreements rose to the forefront of political
concern when the Supreme Court decided FTC v. Actavis, Inc. in 2013. This case
disputed the legality of the FTC bringing antitrust litigation against the parties to a
reverse payment settlement.102  Historically, pay-for-delay agreements were
viewed as legal settlements as opposed to business ventures.103 Because the
patent holder has the right to file a dispute under the ANDA, a reverse payment
plan was the response to this disagreement. The courts have no legal right to
force civil litigation if the parties opt for a settlement.104 The court dismissed this
distinction, deciding that if the settlement has monopolistic effects outside the
grant of the legal patent monopoly, then the settlement could be open to FTC
antitrust litigation.10s While this seems like an obvious conclusion, the court has a
historic rule to not interfere with settlement agreements, even those that end with
the suing party paying the defendant (which is the form reverse payment
settlements take). Nonetheless, the majority believes the dissent is incorrect in its
assumption that these agreements are the same and agrees to allow antitrust
9 Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Genencs Drugs, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2017).
95 David Kurlander, Rebalandng Pay-For-Delay: Why No-Authoriked Genenc Agreements Should Be
Subject to I-ligherAntitrust Scrutiny, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 683, 869 (2014).
9 Id at 691.
1oo Daniel E. Troy, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Amendments), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/tcs
timony/ucml 15033.htm.
101 Kang, supra note 6, at 85.
102 Jamie Towey & Brad Albert, Is FTC v. Actavis Causing Pharma Companies to Change Their
Behavior?, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competi
tion-matters/2016/01/ftc-v-actavis-causing-pharma-companies-change-their.
103 See generaly Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
to4 Id at 2230.
105 Id at 2233.
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concerns to stand with the simple "we think, [reverse payment settlements] is
something quite different" as an explanation.106
The Court held that pay-for-delay agreements are more than settlements on
patent litigation rights, but the Actavis case holding is highly specific in scope.
The Court takes considerable efforts to articulate the decision around the
pharmaceutical industry, outlining "four key features of the relevant drug-
regulatory framework" that control generic and name brand drug
manufacturing on the first page of the opinion. 0 7 This focus might indicate
that the holding's legal arguments will not be applied to these types of
agreements outside of the drug industry.
The Supreme Court broadly interpreted the Hatch-Waxman Act in Eli Lily
& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.108 only five years after the Act was initiated. The holding
was significant. The Court interpreted the Act to apply not only to drug
companies, but also to medical devices. 0 9 This inclusion was not a passive
decision. The Federal District in Philadelphia had specially dismissed -the
defendant's affirmative defense on the grounds that the Hatch-Waxman Act
only applied to pharmaceuticals. The medical device in question was not a drug
dispensing device that could be considered within the framework of the law. It
instead centered around a cardioverter defibrillator that works as an
electromechanical signaling device on the heart; no pharma-tech was involved
with its function.11 0 The consequence of this case is that generic device
manufacturers are now under the umbrella of protection of the latch-Waxman
Act despite the common rhetoric that the Act applies only to
pharmaceuticals."' Therefore, to be consistent with stare decisis, the legal
argument for Actavis must rely more heavily on the nature of the pharmaceutical
industry and not the legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
IV. GENERIC DEVICES AND 3-D PRINTING
Additive manufacturing, also known as 3-D printing, is a process that
marries computer automated design (CAD) directly with the physical world.
106 Id
107 Id at 2230.
108 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
109 Id at 669.
110 Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Consider Medical Device Patent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/11/business/high-court-to-consider-medical-device-patent.
html.
I" See Troy, supra note 100 (making no mention of the Act's application outside of the
pharmaceutical industry).
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With the market flooding with affordable home 3-D printers costing less than
the average laptop,11 2 their commercial counterparts rival the cost of a high-end
MRI machine. 113 The market disruption potential for the technology in the
medical field is apparent.114 The possibility of 3-D printing medical devices is
moving from theory to practice. The end of 2015 saw eighty-five FDA-
approved 3-D printed medical devices.1 15 From teeth straightening to portal
veins, the industry is booming because the only barrier to entry is purchasing
power-"allowing every individual with the means to buy one, the ability to
become a manufacturer."1 6  The major difference in pharmaceuticals and
medical devices is the generic market. Currently, there are minimal to no
generic device manufactures, but instead, developers add "upgrades" to the
devices currently on the market.117 Additive manufacturing 3-D printing is
expected to change this, potentially forcing regulatory agencies, courts, and
industry to shift current practices with generic pharmaceuticals to a generic
device industry. 18
What the Supreme Court failed to recognize in Actavis is that a similar FDA
expedited approval exists for medical devices outside of Hatch-Waxman." 9
While the court in Eli Lily applied the Hatch-Waxman Act to medical devices,
it did so on a narrow scope.120 In practice, medical device manufacturers
primarily employ 510(k) for an expedited approval of a substantially similar
device.121 The 510(k) Premarket Notification program was established under
112 XYprinting da Vinci Jr. 1.0n 3D Printer, OFFICE DEPOT (2016), http://www.officedepot.
com/a/products/435716/XYZprinting-da-Vinci-Jr-10w-3D/.
113 Jerome Groopman, Print Thyself NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2014/11/24/print-thyself (pricing a medical grade 3D printer at $250,000). Steve
Rentz, MRI Machine Cost and Price Guide [2017 Update], BLOCK IMAGING (Mar. 2, 2017, 11:55
AM), https://info.blockimaging.com/bid/92623/mri-machine-cost-and-price-guide (pricing high
end MRI devices at $250,000-$400,000).
114 Celeste A. Letourneau et al., 3D Printing of Medcal Devices: When a Novel Technology Meets
Traditional legalPrincdples, REEDSMITH (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.reedsnith.com/en/perspecti
ves/2015/09/3d-printing-of-medical-devices--when-a-novel-techn.
115 3D Printing of Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/3DPrintingofMedicalDevices/default.htm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2017).
116 Letourneau et al., supra note 114, at 3.
117 Clayton Phillipp, The Benefits of Generic Medical Devices, KEMPER MEDICAL INC. (Sept. 14,
2015), http://www.kempermedical.com/blog/the-benefits-of-generic-medical-devices/.
118 See -leather Thompson, The Future of Devices is Generic, MEDICAL DEVICE AND DIAGNOsTIC
INDUSTRY (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.mddionline.com/article/future-devices-generic; see also
Phillipp, supra note 117.
119 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
120 Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 102-03 (D. Del. 1989).
121 Letourneau et al., supra note 114, at 8.
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the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.122 One primary differences between 510(k) and Hatch-Waxman
is the classification system based on the safety and effectiveness characteristics
of the device. 1 2 3 Different regulations apply for each of the three classes, with
the lowest in Class 1124 up to Class 111.125 Mirroring the Hatch-Waxman Act's
ANDA, 510(k) has a Premarket Approval (PMA) that grants FDA clearance to
devices that pass much less rigorous testing compared with its already approved
parent. When generic devices come to the market, this scheme along with the
Hatch-Waxman Act 180-day generic monopoly could persuade brand name
device manufacturers to negotiate pay-for-delay agreements with the generics.
A. HOSPITAL ECONOMICS
The United States healthcare industry is a highly complex system with a
multitude of actors. Hospital conglomerates (such as Hospital Corporation of
America) own and operate 3,183 of the 5,627 hospitals in America. The
number of not-for-profit and for-profit is near evenly split.126 Five thousand
nine hundred and thirty private domestic healthcare insurance providers
collected two trillion dollars in domestic premiums in 2015 alone.127 H-owever,
public health insurance (including Medicaid, Medicare, and Military healthcare)
is held by 37.1%128 of the population. The government pays a notably
disproportionate 47%+ of the total healthcare costs in America for these
services. 129  Public health insurance therefore plays a substantial role in the
industry. For a hospital to accept public health insurance, it must comply with
numerous and onerous regulations.
122 PMA Approvak- General Information, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.
gov/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/deviceapprovalsandclearances/pmaapproval
s/default.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
123 Arthur K. Yellin, What Are 510(K) Clearance and PremarketApprovaR, DEVICE WATCH (Jan. 9,
2009), http://www.devicewatch.org/reg/510k.shtml.
124 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2012).
125 Id § 360e(b)(1).
126 Fast Facts on US Hospitals: Fast Facts 2016, AMERICAN s-iSPrTAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.
aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts20l6.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
127 State Insurance Regulation: Key Facts and Market Trends, NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSION ERS 5 (2016), http://www.naic.org/state-report-cards/report card-wa.pdf.
128 Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2015, U.S. CENsUS BUREAU 3 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-257.pdf
129 See Mark Almberg, Government Funds Neary Two-Thirds of U.S. Health Care Costs: American
Journal of Public Health Study, PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL 11EAITH PROGRAM (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2016/januay/government-funds-nearly-two-thirds-of-us-health-ca
re-costs-american-journal-of-pub.
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The argument in support of shielding hospitals from anti-trust litigation if a
member of a pay-for-delay agreement relies on the government's regulation
over their specific market. Regulated by the Department of Health and Human
Services in conjunction with by state health administrations, hospitals are one of
few businesses where performance in certain circumstances is mandatory
despite the economic status of the consumer and the hospital's ownership. 30
These federal and state regulations control both public and private hospitals.
On the federal level, Section 1867 of the Social Security Act, also referred to as
Emergency Medical and Treatment Labor Act (EMTALA), was enacted in 1985
as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).
EMTALA only applies to Medicare-participating hospitals with emergency
services. These hospitals are required to provide a medical screening
examination for all emergency medical condition, regardless of a patient's ability
to pay.131 EMTALA applies to every patient at the participating hospital, not
just the Medicare-covered.
The passage of the Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute 32 in 1987 greatly
restricted alternative forms of income for physicians and health care providers
outside of direct payment for services133 Kickbacks from pharmaceutical and
device companies had become popular-the physician or group would accept a
return for patient referrals. The statute was extremely broad and systematically
ended "kickbacks, bribes, and rebates made directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, or in cash or in kind."M It is important to note that this statue was
passed in 1987, over twenty years prior to Affordable Care Act that greatly
increased the number of government-insured patients. These patients are even
further protected under Stark Law (I and II). 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395nn protects
Medicaid and Medicare patients from financially self-interested referring
physicians.1 35 All of these laws are centrally focused on healthcare consumer
protection, but take little interest in the financial state of the physicians and
groups.
Under the Affordable Care Act, healthcare insurance is now legally
mandatory with the federal government stepping in to provide public insurance
130 Carol Pryor & Robert Seifert, Unintended Consequences: How Federal Regulations and Hospital
Policies Can Leave Patients in Debt, HELLER SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND MANAGEMENT,
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, June 2003, at 1.
131 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d) (2012).
132 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
133 Jason Chimon et al., Health Care Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L REv. 783, 793 (2011).
13 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (July 29, 1991), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/do
cs/safeharborregulations/072991.htm.
135 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
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for income and age qualified citizens.1 36 The Act has dramatically changed the
percentage of publicly covered individuals with "20 million people gain[ing]
health insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act between the passage
of the health reform law in 2010 and early 2016."137 With the current political
climate in the United States, the future of this legislation is unknown.138
Because of this uncertainty, it is important that the argument is not
substantiated by its implementation. It has affected the percentages and
statistics, however, it is unlikely that these trends are to dramatically change in
the upcoming years.139
The failure of the American Health Care Act of 2017140 further supports this
supposition. The American Health Care Act of 2017 dominated the newsstands
and social media outlets over the summer.141 The bill was politically polarizing as
it attempted to greatly cut back from the Affordable Health Care Act passed
under President Barack Obama.142 The bill was passed by the House of
Representatives by a 217-213 margin on May 4, 2017, after being introduced on
March 20, 2017.143 Within the House, the bill only saw minor amendments
including the MacArthur Amendment and a direct Committee Report.144
136 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 18001 (2012).
137 Tamara Rosin, 17 Statistics on the Current State of U.S. Healthcare Spending, Finances, BECKER
HOSPITALREv. (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/17-fascinating-
statistics-on-the-current-state-of-us-healthcare-spending-finances.html.
1s Teresa Mears, How Affordable Care Act Marketplace Insurance Plans Will Change in 2017, U.S.
NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:25 AM), http://moncy.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/
2016-11-28/how-affordable-care-act-marketplace-insurancc-plans-will-change-in-2017.
139 Id
' American Health Case Act of 2017, 115th Cong. (2017-2018).
141 See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times, NEWsWEEK
(july 29, 2017, 6:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repeal-and-replace-70-
failed-attempts-643832; see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TiirER (July 29, 2017,
9:27 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/891334415347060736, Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWirrER (July 29, 2017, 1:36 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonal
dTrump/status/891397134662193152, Fox NEWS (@FoxNews), TWITTER (july 30, 2017, 8:36
AM), https://twitter.com/FoxNews/status/891683935146717184, Fox NEws (@FoxNews),
TivirrER (june 23, 2017, 4:51 PM), https://twitter.com/FoxNws/status/87840021842488934 5,
House Democrats (@HouseDemocrats), TwITrER (Apr. 23, 2017, 2:13 PM), https://twitter.
com/louseDemocrats/status/856254703436476416, THE. HILL (@thehill), TWIsrER (July 29,
2017, 2:37 PM), https://twitter.com/thehill/status/891412289865355264. All are excellent reads
from summer 2017 demonstrating the predominance of the American Health Care Act's control
over media at the time.
142 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
143 HR. REP. No. 115-52, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/1 15th-congress/h
ouse-rcport/52/1.
144 Health Care Freedom Act of 2017 (I-ICFA), 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.budget.sena
te.gov/imo/media/doc/HealthCareFrecedomAct.pdf.
19
Jackson: Additive Manufacturing, Pay-for-Delay, and Mandatory Care: Is The
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2017
J. INTELL PROP. L
The Senate attempted to revise the bill three times. The revised-
"skinny"-version of the bill was still ultimately rejected.145 Currently, the bill
is not dead per se. The bill could see even more revisions, or possibly a
redrafting. It is likely that a total repeal/replace of the Affordable Health Care
Act will not pass, instead an amendment package might have a higher chance of
bicameral approval.146
The numbers can be overwhelming, but they are important in understanding
the current shifting landscape. The financial stability of the industry is hotly
debated due to ever-increasing government regulation.147 While healthcare
services is one of the nation's leading industries in gross profits,148 regulations
have cut deeply into the pockets of healthcare organizations (HCOs) resulting
in uncertain financial future for the market.149 Hospitals' primary consumer is
the patient, and patients are currently required by law to carry health
insurance. 150 The insurance provider is responsible for payments outside of a
decided deductible to the hospital. These price agreements between the
hospital (or hospital group) and the insurance provider allow for a more
streamlined bargaining process for cost of services.151 It is when the insurance
companies fail to pay the coverage that loss occurs; this is called bad debt
loss. 1 52 This loss is not from pro-bono work, charity, or indigents, but from
under or negligent reimbursement from a debtor who is capable of payment.153
Medicare and Medicaid are currently accepted at 4,788 hospitals154 yet "the
ability of government payers to adequately reimburse providers leads the list of
145 Gisele Grayson, The Senate Health Care Vote, Simpified, NPR (July 4, 2017, 4:23 PM), https://
www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/07/2459051768/the-same-health-care-bote-simplified.
146 Louis Jacobson, After the Health Care Bill Failure, What's Next for Congress and the Affordable Care
Act?, POLITIFACT (July 28, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter-article/201
7/jul/28/afterhealth-care-bill-failure-whats-next.
147 Janet Weiner, Economic and Pokcy Insights on the American Health Care Act, HEALTH POLICY
SENSE UNIV. PENN. (May 5, 2017), http://1di.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/economic-and-policy
-insights-american-health-care-act.
148 Louis C. GAPENSKI, H-EAIHCARE FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING AND
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 3 (5th ed. 2012).
149 WILi.AM 0. CLEVERLEY & ANDREW E. CAMERON, ESSENTIALS OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE,
Chapter 3: Financial Environment of Health Care Organizations 34 (2007).
50 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
151 Sammy Mack, They Paid How Much? How Negotiated Deals Hide Health Care's Cost, NPR (Nov.
15, 2014, 7:48 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/11/15/364064088/.
152 Bad Debt: Money Owed to an Individual That Cannot be Collect, Business Bad Debts, IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/publications/p535/ch4O.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2017).
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[bad debt loss] concerns."' 55 While hospital enrollment in Medicare and
Medicaid coverage is not mandatory, it is economically infeasible not to accept
the government insurance. 156 Remember that government payment makes up
more than 47% of the total healthcare costs in America, and thus, too great a
market margin to make refusal of government insurance economically possible.
This percentage, coupled with EMTALA, COBRA, anti-kickback statues, and
other regulatory laws, guarantees the healthcare industry is particularly
positioned as both a public and private service.
Hospitals are uniquely equipped to develop 3D-printed generic alternatives
to brand named devices. Additive manufacturing technology is most
impressive for its ease of adaptability for customized patient fittings. It relies
on scanning technology, most commonly MRI machines, present in all
hospitals. Hospitals already utilize the technology to prepare for complicated
surgeries with exact copies of patient defects1 57 and have the proper medical
and engineering professionals on staff to ease into the emerging market with
little to no cost.158
V. THE ARGUMENT
There is a strong argument for allowing reverse payment settlements in the
medical device industry for hospitals creating generics instead of purchasing
from name brand manufacturers. Reverse payment settlements in this context
should be tolerated and shielded from antitrust litigation. The argument relies
on two fundamental conclusions from the research:
(1) Anti-trust laws are now motivated by preventing unfair
competition instead of strictly centered on consumer
protection interest. The rich historical case law and
legislation outlined above highlight the current weight courts
place on anticompetitive effects on the market.59 The
reality of this less focused locus of consideration and the
155 GAPENSKI, supra note 148, at 18-19.
156 Underpayment by Medicare and Medicaid Fact Sheet, AM. losP. Ass'N 1 (Dec. 2016), https://
data.medicare.gov/Hospital-Compare/1-ospital-General-Information/xubh-q36u.
s? Lisa Schencker, Hospitals Printing 3-D Hearts to He in Surgeries, C-u. TmiB. (Oct. 23, 2016,
12:43 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-3d-printed-hearts-surgery-1023-biz-201
61021-story.html.
158 Hospital Maintenance Engineer, I-ATICARE PATHWAY, http://www.healthcarepathway.com/
-ealth-Care-Careers/hospital-maintenance-engineer.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
1s9 See sapra text accompanying notes 38-53.
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rule of reason analysis applied to anti-trust cases are
inconsistent judgments that often reflect the political
climate. 160 While under the Obama administration America
saw a rise m antitrust scrutiny'16 and the adoption of the
patient/consumer friendly Affordable Care Act.162  The
political goals of the current Trump administration are less
clear. While recent health insurance mergers have been
blocked for antitrust public policy concerns,1 63 economists
speculate that the Trump Administration will take a more
light- handed approach to antitrust litigation than its
predecessor under President Obama.64 If President
Trump's executive branch is open to more mergers and
acquisitions, pay-for-delay agreements outside the
pharmaceutical context could be tolerated from an antitrust
perspective if the agreements are not against public policy.
(2) The Court and legislation indicate that very little market
activity qualifies as patent misuse in the form of unfair
competition. One must conclude Actavis should be
construed strictly and not apply outside of its narrow field of
interest so that the two laws [patent law and antitrust law] do
not contradict each other.
(3) Hospitals are bound by government regulations to provide
treatment without promise of compensation and often face
under-reimbursement from the government controlled
insurance companies. Therefore, hospitals should be given
an alternative means of income by the government to offset
the costs imposed on the industry.
If the three statements are true, it is fair and equitable to allow hospitals to enter
into reverse payment settlements with medical device manufacturers without
threat of antitrust litigation. The history and current state of the law call for the
160 See supra text accompanying note 53.
161 See supra text accompanying note 58.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 130-37.
163 Annie Ropeik, What Does Anthem-Cigna Failure Say About Health Insurance Mergers?, WFYI
(May 15, 2017), http://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/what-does-anthem-cigna-failure-say-about-
health-insurance-mergers.
164 David C. Kully & Andrew J. Steif, Antitrust Enforcement Under Trump: Less Intervention But Not
Abandonment, LEXOLOGY (May 1, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e5df4
84d-8c-8d-4811-8fed-a430bcl3cccO.
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Supreme Court to revisit reverse payment settlements. The law should be
amended to shield hospitals from antitrust litigation regarding generic device
manufacturing reverse payment settlements.
A. POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS
First, if the federal courts apply Actavis to generic devices by an ER Lilly
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Supreme Court should revisit the
pay-for-delay scheme outside of the context of the pharmaceutical industry and
reevaluate its economically based arguments for opening the agreement to
costly antitrust litigation. This move would not be unprecedented. The
"narrowest ground" doctrine, formally introduced in Marks v. United States,'6
would surely apply here. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court will, in cases
of split decisions such as Actavis, "be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." 66
Therefore, the scope of Actavis should be construed to involve only the
particular industry in which the case is held under a stare decisis rationale.
Second, the concern that the anti-kickback statute might cover pay-for-delay
agreements between hospitals and medical device developers is not unfounded.
The counter argument for this concern is that the patent holder has a legal
monopoly over the market. The court could find that with no alternative
outside of a hospital produced generic device, there is no kick-back for failing
to produce in house. Finally, offsetting the costs of more expensive devices
might not be absorbed by insurance companies but rather spread to consumers.
The cost might outweigh the benefit of offsetting failing healthcare financials.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Activis, it seemed the Supreme Court effectively ended pay-for-delay
agreements. The holding allowed FTC antitrust intervention when patent terms
were expanded to limit generic pharmaceutical manufacturing. However, the
holding was clear-this bar would be specifically applied to the pharmaceutical
industry due to its complex structure and public policy implications. There is a
strong argument that the negative impact of these agreements could not exist
outside of the narrow pharmaceutical market. Reverse payment plans might be
beneficial in other industries that Activis might not limit.
165 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
166 Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 420 (1992).
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Currently, there is heavy regulatory control over hospital care and health
insurance through the Affordable Care Act. Hospitals are mandatory providers
of emergency services, citizens are required to carry health insurance, and
federal health insurance providers are responsible for a large percentage of
hospital bad debt. The government is requiring performance yet failing to
adequately compensate for those services. This issue could be, at least partially,
remedied if the government afforded hospitals a financial incentive for
compliance. The incentive possibilities are numerous, however one might be to
tolerate reverse payment plans between medical device manufacturers and
hospitals despite limiting hospital production of generic devices (though 3D
printing). Outside the scope of Activis, these agreements might not have the
negative public policy effects that worried the Court-instead, tolerating the
agreements might mitigate some of the economic burden imposed on hospitals
from the Affordable Care Act.
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